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By JAMES A. R. NAFZIGER*
TRANSNATIONAL legal controls over the protection, use, enjoyment,
and transfer of cultural property, particularly art and archaeological
material, have developed steadily in recent years.' Despite this develop-
ment, controls remain haphazard and dependent upon the rather unfet-
tered discretion of sovereigns and intergovernmental and nongovern-
mental organizations. The most important of these organizations is the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), whose role in a lengthy dispute over Israeli excavation in
occupied Jerusalem is instructive to artists and lawyers alike.
While it is refreshing to read that "the entire world still follows
with interest the news of any archaeological discoveries in Jerusalem,"'
it is depressing to realize that the political world greets the news of any
excavation there with a cynical eye. Action taken in 1974 by UNES-
CO, and the reaction to it, serve to confirm both the politicization of
* B.A., 1962, M.A., 1969, University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1967, Harvard Uni-
versity. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law.
1. See generally ART LAW: DOMESTIc AND INTERNATIONAL (L Du Boff ed.
1975); Nafziger, Controlling the Northward Flow of Mexican Antiquities, 7 LAWYER
OF THE AMERICAS 68 (1975); Nafziger, Regulation by the International Council of Mu-
seums: An Example of the Role of Non-governmental Organizations in the Transna-
tional Legal Process, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. & Poi. 231 (1972); Comment, The Legal Re-
sponse to the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 932 (1973);
Comment, Legal Approaches to the Trade in Stolen Antiquities, 2 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
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global cultural development and the fragility of the international legal
framework for facilitating such development. After summarizing the
dispute, this article will examine the elements of this legal framework,
discuss why it collapsed during 1974, and suggest how it might be
repaired and improved.
The controversy over the archaeological excavations in Israeli-
occupied territory centers on activities in Jerusalem.3  Excavations in
this city commenced shortly after Israel assumed military control over
the area following the termination of hostilities in 1967. Areas involved
include land along the monumental Western Wall surrounding Har-
ames-Sharif, which contains the two Moslem mosques of Al-Aqsa and
the Dome of the Rock, and land in adjacent Moslem Waqf territory and
in the old Jewish quarter. A primary aim of the excavations has been to
"make a stratigraphic study of the site in order to reveal the history of
ancient Jerusalem." 4  Particular goals have included exploration of
areas adjacent to the Herodian Wall and examination of the lower strata
presumably enclosing the First Temple, a site profoundly significant to
Jewish culture.5  With a few exceptions, the excavations have been
conducted according to acceptable archaeological techniques and with
due regard to divergent cultural and religious interests6 although it has
been determined that the excavations are not urgently needed to con-
serve these sites. 7 Despite this general care and concern, however, the
Israelis have, in carrying out the excavations, destroyed certain property
which, it is claimed, is of historical and cultural significance to the
Arabs.' This claimed destruction of property led to the lengthy dispute,
3. The legal status of Jerusalem is uncertain, but it is commonly agreed that it
is occupied by Israel, and such was the assumption during this controversy. See gen-
erally Cole, Property and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: A Reexamination, 137
WORLD AFFAIRS 66, 68 (1974); Reyner & Philips, Jerusalem: A Factual Background,
137 WORLD AFFAIRS 326 (1975); Comment, Israel: Conqueror, Liberator, or Occupier
Within the Context of International Law, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 206 (1975).
4. Observations of the Government of Israel on the Alleged Violations of the
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, UNESCO Doe. 87 EX/34 at 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Observations of Is-
rael].
5. The Israeli government expressed its commitment to undertake the excavations
more generally "for the sake of man's cultural heritage and its enrichment." Id. at 2.
6. See Report of the Director-General on the Implementation of 88 EX/Dec.
4.3.1, UNESCO Doc. 89 EX/19 Add. 2 (1972); Information Note Presented By the
Director-General, UNESCO Doc. 88 EX/47 (1971); Communication from Professor
H. J. Reinink, Commissioner-General for Cultural Property to Israel, UNESCO Doc.
87 EX/35 (1971).
7. See Information Note Presented By the Director-General, UNESCO Doc. 88/
EX/47 at 3 (1971).
8. See Report of the Government of Jordan on the Violation of the Hague Con-
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principally between Israel and Jordan, concerning the propriety and
legality of the Israeli excavations.
In 1974 the UNESCO General Conference,' acting in the face of
what it perceived as Israeli violations of resolutions and decisions of
UNESCO and the United Nations General Assembly and Security
Council, adopted two resolutions concerning Israel. The first 0 of these
rejected an Israeli request to be included in UNESCO's European
regional group,:" and the second' 2 invited the director-general' 3 of
UNESCO "to withhold assistance from Israel in the fields of education,
science and culture until such time as it scrupulously respects the
resolutions and decisions" of the Executive Board 4 and General Con-
ference. The two resolutions neither excluded Israel from UNESCO
nor lacked precedent in turning down, without prejudice, Israels re-
vention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
UNESCO Doe. 88 EX/46 (1971); Report from the Government of Jordan on the Viola-
tion of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, UNESCO Doc. 87 EX/31 (1971). Israel responded: "Not only has
there been no damage to Moslem cultural property but these excavations have unearthed,
inter alia, interesting Moslem Umayyad remains. Arab workers are employed in the
excavations, Arab students join the volunteer workers who assist the archaeologists and
Arab visitors to the excavations include members of the Moslem Council in Jerusalem.
'The excavations present no danger whatsoever to Moslem religious buildings."
Observations of Israel, supra note 4, at 2.
9. UNESCO is governed by a General Conference, an Executive Board and a
Secretariat. Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization, art. I, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1945, 61 Stat. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 1580,
4 U.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter cited as UNESCO Constitution]. The General Confer-
ence consists of representatives of member states. Id., art. IV. It meets every two years
to fix policies and to approve the program and budget for the next two years. Id., art.
IV(9).
10. UNESCO Doc. 18 C/VR 42, 1 51.1, 51.2 (prov. ed. 1974).
11. Regional groups have been established by UNESCO to carry out and decen-
tralize the organization's activities. The groups conduct regional programs, centers, in-
stitutes, and other projects. Until 1973 the groups were organized on a very informal
basis. In that year the Executive Board decided to organize them on a systematic basis
and invited member countries to join in their classification. Criteria for Invitations to
Regional Meetings, UNESCO Doc. 92 EX/Dec. 4.2 (1973).
12. UNESCO Doc. 18 C/VR 39, 11 124.9, 124.10 (prov. ed. 1974).
13. The director-general, who is nominated by the Executive Board and appointed
by the General Conference, is the chief administrative officer of UNESCO. His specific
duties include the formulation of proposals for appropriate action by the conference and
board and the appointment of staff members. See UNESCO Constitution, supra note
9, art. 6.
14. The Executive Board, elected by the General Conference and acting under it,
is responsible for the execution of the program adopted by the conference. Its specific
duties include the preparation of an agenda and program of work for the conference,
the recommendation to the conference of new members, and the presentation, after re-
view, of the annual report of the director-general. See id. art. 5(B).
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quest, thereby allowing Israel to reapply for membership in the Europe-
an regional group at a later time. The votes on the resolutions generally
conformed to familiar East-West and Arab-Israeli bloc patterns. The
reaction of important elements in the press, cultural community, and
UNESCO membership was immediate and most often hostile.' 5
UNESCO's action, excluding Israel from the European regional
group and withholding assistance, raises questions of that organization's
role in responding to international conflict over cultural property. The
legal framework within which UNESCO's response to the Israeli excava-
tions was fixed is a product of the 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 6 and of
certain United Nations and UNESCO resolutions. This framework will
be examined, with emphasis on evaluating its capacity to contain con-
flict over cultural property and the role which it assigns to UNESCO,
rather than on investigating the legality of past conduct.17 After explor-
15. The media responded with a spate of criticial articles. See, e.g., Brickman,
UNESCO As A Politicized Agency, 103 INTELLECT 451 (1975); Gillette, UNESCO's
Israeli Sanctions Arouse a Bitter Backlash, 186 SCIENCE 1100 (1974); Heindel,
UNESCO in Politics, 103 INTELLECT 361 (1975); Ripley, The View from the Castle;
Mankind's Natural and Cultural Legacy Threatened by International Policies, 5 SMITH-
SONIAN, Mar. 1975, at 6; Ravaging the UNESCO Charter, 74 ART NEWS, Feb. 1975,
at 89; Roche, UNESCO vs. Israel: Playing Politics with Culture, N.Y. Times, § 2 (Mag-
azine), at 1, col. 1 (Dec. 29, 1974). The reaction of artists and other humanists was
equally sharp: "Sixty-two leading figures in the arts and intellectuals, including 19
Nobel Laureates, have declared that they will not cooperate with UNESCO as long as
that agency persists in its decisions to withhold aid to Israel and to exclude Israel from
membership in any of UNESCO's regional groupings. The group, comprised of Chris-
tians as well as Jews, made its position known in an advertisement published in The
New York Times." Intellectual Opposition to UNESCO Policy: Withholding Aid to
Israel, 103 INTELLECT 347 (1975).
Several members of UNESCO, including the United States, reacted by restricting
their ties with UNESCO. See UNESCO and Israel, 171 NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1974,
at 7 (France); N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1974, at 2, col. 4 (Switzerland); N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. I (United States). In the United States, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee voted to cut a $16 million contribution to UNESCO from the for-
eign aid bill, the money to be restored only in the event that UNESCO rescinded its
resolution. UNESCO and Israel, 171 NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1974, at 7.
16. Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, done May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [here-
inafter cited as 1954 Convention].
17. Another analysis, emphasizing the legality of the Israeli activity and UNESCO
resolutions, identifies three questions: "1) whether Israel could legally conduct restora-
tion work and archaeological excavations within occupied territories; 2) whether such
activities endangered the religious and cultural heritage of the city; 3) if Israel's conduct
was illegal, whether the withdrawal of assistance was an appropriate sanction." Lang,
UNESCO and Israel, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 676, 677 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lang].
The article concludes that "[t]he answer to the first question appears to be 'yes'; the
answer to the latter two, almost certainly, 'no.'" Id.
(Vol. 27
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ing this framework, the article will consider the appropriateness of the
dispute-settlement techniques and sanctions relied upon by UNESCO
and will evaluate alternative modes of responding to international con-
fiet over activity involving cultural property. It will be suggested that
UNESCO's prohibition of all excavations, rather than supervision of
them, proved destructive to a settlement of the dispute.'
The Legality of Israeli Excavation in Light of the 1954 Hague
Convention and United Nations Resolutions
The preamble to the 1954 convention describes armed conflict as
the underlying basis for invocation of the convention's provisions, 19
which have their roots in article 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.20 The 1954
convention provides for the settlement of disputes subject to it by means
of a conciliation procedure, which allows for UNESCO assistance.
21
18. One commentator emphasizes that the most "sinister" aspect of the UNESCO
affair was the pervasive indifference to scholarship, history, and truth: "In this there
is no objectivity, no restraint in placing blame on only one side, when indeed it belongs
to both." Ripley, The View from the Castle, 5 SMITHSONAN, March 1975, at 6.
19. 1954 Convention, supra note 16, preamble, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
20. The Hague Convention of 1907 provides:
"The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity,
and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private
property.
"All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this character,
historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the sub-
ject of legal proceedings." Convention with Other Powers Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, art. 56, T.S. No. 539.
21. Article 22 provides:
"1. The Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices in all cases where they
may deem it useful in the interests of cultural property, particularly if there is disagree-
ment between the Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the
provisions of the present Convention or the Regulations for its execution.
"2. For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either at the invitation
of one Party, of the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization, or on its own initiative, propose to the Parties to the conflict a
meeting of their representatives, and in particular of the authorities responsible for the
protection of cultural property, if considered appropriate on suitably chosen neutral terri-
tory. The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the proposals for meet-
ing made to them. The Protecting Powers shall propose for approval by the Parties to
the conflict a person belonging to a neutral Power or a person presented by the Director-
General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which
person shall be invited to take part in such a meeting in the capacity of Chairman."
Article 23 provides:
"1. The High Contracting Parties may call upon the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization for technical assistance in organizing the protection
of their cultural property, or in connexion with any other problem arising out of the
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Upon the initiation of armed conflict, this scheme calls for the appoint-
ment of a commissioner-general for cultural property from an interna-
tional list of qualified persons. This procedure was followed in the
instant dispute.
Article 5(1) of the 1954 convention, entitled "Occupation," pro-
vides that:
Any High Contracting Party in occupation of the whole or part of
the territory of another High Contracting Party shall as far as pos-
sible support the competent national authorities of the occupied
country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.
23
Article l(a) defines cultural property as including archaeological
sites.2 4  The term "preserving" is not specifically defined, but in context
it would seem to refer to the protection of cultural property, which
article 2 defines as "the safeguarding of and respect for such proper-
ty."' 25 Article 3 defines safeguarding in terms of preparations in time
of peace against the foreseeable effects of armed conflict.26 Article 4
application of the present Convention or the Regulations for its execution. The Organ-
ization shall accord such assistance within the limits fixed by its programme and by its
resources.
"2. The Organization is authorized to make, on its own initiative, proposals on
this matter to the High Contracting Parties." 1954 Convention, supra note 16, arts. 22-
23, 249 U.N.T.S. 256, 258.
22. Article 6 of the regulations passed at the convention provides:
"1. The Commissioner-General for Cultural Property shall deal with all matters
referred to him in connexion with the application of the Convention, in conjunction with
the representatives of the Party to which he is accredited and with the delegates con-
cerned.
"2. He shall have powers of decision and appointment in the cases specified in
the present Regulations.
"3. With the agreement of the Party to which he is accredited, he shall have the
right to order an investigation or to conduct it himself.
"4. He shall make any representations to the Parties to the conflict or to their
Protecting Powers which he deems useful for the application of the Convention.
"5. He shall draw up such reports as may be necessary on the application of the
Convention and communicate them to the Parties concerned and to their Protecting
Powers. He shall send copies to the Director-General of UNESCO, who may make use
only of their technical contents.
"6. If there is no Protecting Power, the Commissioner-General shall exercise the
functions of the Protecting Power." Regulations for the Execution of the Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, done May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 272, 274.
The regulations are an "integral part" of "the procedure by which the . . . Conven-
tion is to be applied." 1954 Convention, supra note 16, art. 20, 249 U.N.T.S. 256.
23. 1954 Convention, supra note 16, art. 5, para. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. 244 (emphasis
added).
24. Id. art. 1, para. a, 249 U.N.T.S. 242.
25. Id. art. 2, 249 U.N.T.S. 242.
26. Id. art. 3.
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defines "respect for cultural property" in terms of restraints upon acts of
negligence, hostility, theft, pillage, vandalism, and misappropriation
directed against cultural property.17  Although reading article two's
definition of protection into article five's "preserving" would result in
the redundant use of the word "safeguarding," the resulting interpreta-
tion seems most consistent with the primary goal of the convention as
discussed below. Thus the meaning, and therefore the application, of
article 5 requires reference to articles 2, 3, and 4, the definitional articles.
Both the text of the 1954 convention and its historical back-
ground,28 particularly the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the
Geneva convention of 1949, disclose that the 1954 convention's essen-
tial application is to the threat of actual bombardment. Construing the
terms "safeguarding and preserving" in article 5 to be legally coexten-
sive with the terms "safeguarding" and "protection" in articles 2 and 3
supports this interpretation, since, as stated, article 3 talks in terms of
the foreseeable consequences of armed conflict. Article 3, however, is
limited to conduct occurring in time of peace. It is arguable that the
Israeli archaeological activities did not take place in time of peace and
that therefore article 3, and through it article 5, do not apply.
If the convention is not invoked by article 5 because the conduct
did not occur in time of peace, the convention may still be applied
through article 18. That article provides that "[a]part from the provi-
sions which shall take effect in time of peace," the convention shall
apply whenever a declared war or armed conflict exists between two or
more contracting parties, or whenever there is a partial or total occupa-
tion of the territory of a contracting party. 29 Nevertheless, even if the
convention is applied through article 18, the convention's essential
concern would be, as stated above, with conduct which looks toward
meeting the threat of actual bombardment.
Finally, if one assumes that the excavations occurred in time of
peace, a doubtful assumption, then article 5 does apply. Article 5,
however, by reference to article 3, is concerned with preparations for the
foreseeable effects of armed conflict. Thus, whether the convention
applies through article 5 or article 18, the result is the same-a concern
with conduct which looks toward preparation for armed conflict. Since
Israel's archaeological activities are neither included within the activities
proscribed by article 4 nor detrimental to safeguarding and preserving
27. Id. art. 4, 249 U.N.T.S. 242, 244.
28. S. BAiLEY, PRom~MoNs AND RESTrAmNTs IN WAR 65 (1972).
29. See 1954 Convention, supra note 16, art. 18, 249 U.N.T.S. 254, 256.
cultural property in time of peace from the foreseeable effects of armed
conflict, it is diffficult to apply the convention to Israel's nonmilitary
archaeological activity, whether one adopts a textual approach or a
contextual, purposive approach to interpretation.
It is arguable, however, that the phrase "safeguarding and preserv-
ing" in article 5 refers to a more comprehensive process of conservation
unrelated to the presence of armed conflict, or a threat of it, within the
occupied territory. Such an interpretation is strengthened by the appar-
ent autonomy of article 5, addressed explicitly to the responsibilities of
an occupying power. Moreover, Article 5(2) imposes a specific obliga-
tion upon an occupying power to preserve that portion of the cultural
property in an occupied territory which is "damaged by military opera-
tions" whenever national authorities are unable to do so.1° Since article
5(2) refers specifically to property damaged by military operations, it
could be argued that article 5(1), which requires support in preserving
cultural property, refers broadly to all cultural property, not only that
which has been exposed to armed conflict; nor, for that matter, only that
which might become exposed to such conflict, inasmuch as the term
"safeguarding" covers such property."'
If the more comprehensive interpretation is given to article 5, it
follows that simply because Israel was an occupying power of Jerusalem,
the country was under an obligation "as far as possible" to support
Jordan in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property, even in the
absence of armed conflict. It is clear that Israel did not even consult, let
alone support, Jordan, but there is no indication whether Jordan sought
such support or whether there were in fact either prescriptive or pros-
criptive measures for Israel to support. In addition it is arguable,
though not persuasive, that, given the tense political context Israel
discharged her obligation as far as possible even though she did nothing
in cooperation with Jordan.
It is frustratingly clear, therefore, that the convention is ambiguous
when applied to the activities of an occupying power engaged in peace-
ful, scientifically commendable archaeological excavation. Available
travaux preparatoires and other authoritative documentation do not
clarify the intended scope of the convention. Nevertheless, the ambigui-
ty of the convention arguably imposed an affirmative obligation on
30. Id. art. 5, para. 2, 249 U.N.T.S. 244.
31. Article 18 of the convention refers to "provisions which shall take effect in
time of peace," which would seem to include article 5. Id., art. 18, 249 U.N.T.S. 254,
256.
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Israel to apply the process of interpretation provided in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.12 This obligation might arise, even
though Israel is not a signatory of this convention, because the Vienna
convention is, de lege ferenda, the best evidence of customary interna-
tional law. Israel might argue, however, that the norms of the Vienna
convention are so general that they do not dispose of the question of the
country's obligations under the 1954 Hague convention. Thus tradi-
tional canons of interpretation would apply. Although the force of
these canons is questionable under international law today,3" sufficient
ambiguity might persist even after the most thorough, bona fide analysis
to permit Israel to invoke the rule in dubito mitius.4 According to this
rule, and despite the rule of effectiveness, which favors an interpretation
which will give effect to a treaty, a meaning is preferred which is less
onerous to the obligated party, in this case Israel. This rule is a version
of the established presumption against restrictions on sovereignty. More-
over, the burden would seem to have fallen on Jordan to publish a
reasoned "timeous notification" to Israel of its dissenting interpretation
of the convention. 5
There is little evidence to suggest that either Israel or Jordan fully
satisfied its obligation to establish the validity of its position under
international law. One might conclude, given the primitive state of the
international legal process, that their failure to do so excused Israel from
further obligation under the 1954 convention. On the other hand,
Israel's apparent failures first to consult in good faith with Jordan as to
the latter's interpretation of the convention and second to enter into
conciliation or seek technical assistance from UNESCO pursuant to
articles 22 and 23 of the convention 36 militate against such an excuse.
It would appear, therefore, that even if the convention did not
clearly apply to Israeli archaeological excavations, there was sufficient
textual ambiguity on the issue to have required Israel, as an occupying
power, at the very least to assume the burden of undertaking an in-
formed, unbiased inquiry into the country's responsibilities under the
32. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969) (not yet in effect). In addition articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna convention govern the rules and means of interpretation, and
article 65 establishes a procedure to be followed with respect to invalidity, termination,
and withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a treaty. See id.
33. See, e.g., D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 251-53 (2d ed. 1970). See
generally M. McDouAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREE-
MENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).
34. See A. McNAIR, T)iE LAw OF TREATIES 462 (1961).
35. Id. at 429.
36. See 1954 Convention, supra note 16, arts. 22-23, 249 U.N.T.S. 256, 258.
convention. By failing to consult Jordan or, given the polarization of
Middle Eastern politics, by failing to seek the counsel of UNESCO or
another third party, Israel did not discharge the minimum duty imposed
by the convention and therefore came before the UNESCO General
Conference with the equities weighted against the country's archaeologi-
cal activity.
In addition to the convention, the UNESCO General Conference
rested its resolutions and decisions with respect to the Israeli excavations
on United Nations authority. Resolutions 225317 and 225438 of the
United Nations General Assembly call upon Israel to "rescind all mea-
sures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which
would alter the status of Jerusalem." The remarks of the representative
of Pakistan, which sponsored resolution 2253, disclose an intent to
prohibit any Israeli action accompanied by such measures as "the demo-
lition of habitations."3 9  Security Council resolutions 252,40 267, 41 and
29842 proscribe similar activity which would "prejudice the rights of the
inhabitants" or "change the status" of Jerusalem. Resolutions 267 and
298 proceed to define such change to include the "expropriation of land
and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the
incorporation of the occupied section. 43
The proscribed activities, whether construed as an exhaustive list or
merely as examples of the intended scope of the resolutions, do not
appear to encompass all activity by Israel in Jerusalem. In the absence
of widespread or unnecessary demolition of Arab habitations, it is
reasonable to conclude that the archaeological excavations not only do
not "prejudice the rights of inhabitants," taken as a whole, but rather
enrich their lives and the lives of others. Furthermore, although the
Israeli legislation providing for the excavations might be seen as "aimed
at the incorporation of the occupied section,"" this interpretation is far
from necessary. Clearer language in the resolutions might help over-
come their limited force under international law, insofar as they now
simply call upon Israel to take or refrain from taking certain action
37. G. A. Res. 2253, 21A GOAR 5th Emer. Spec. Sess. Supp. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/6798 (1967).
38. G. A. Res. 2254, id.
39. U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 8367, in 10 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 548 (M.
Whiteman ed. 1968).
40. S.C. Res. 252, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev. 1, at 9 (1968).
41. S.C. Res. 267, U.N. Doe. S/INF/24/Rev. 1, at 3 (1969).
42 S.C. Res. 298, U.N. Doc. S/INF/27, at 6 (1971).
43. Id.; S.C. Res. 267, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev. 1, at 3 (1969).
44. S.C. Res. 298, U.N. Doc. S/INF/27, at 6 (1971).
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without announcing a legal decision with binding force. As it is, the
vaguely worded Security Council resolutions would appear to be a weak
foundation upon which to build a case against Israel's archaeological
excavations in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, these resolutions, like the 1954
convention, must be respected, and therefore did impose on Israel an
obligation to obtain an authoritative interpretation of them before pro-
ceeding with the excavations.
UNESCO's Response to the Conflict
At the beginning of the dispute over Israel's excavations, the
UNESCO General Conference called on UNESCO member states to
abide by the 1954 convention, and in addition directed Israel to con-
form to a 1956 recommendation of the General Conference concerning
the international principles applicable in the case of archaeological
excavations. Specifically, the General Conference called upon Israel:
(a) to preserve scrupulously all the sites, buildings and other cul-
tural properties, especially in the Old City of Jerusalem;
(b) to desist from any archaelogical excavations, the transfer of
such properties and any change of their features or their cultural
and historical character; and
(c) to adhere scrupulously to the provisions of the above-men-
tioned Convention, Recommendation, resolutions and decisions
45
As discussed above, it is unclear just what adherence to the convention
required. Regardless of the convention's ambiguity, however, it is clear
that Israel, by continuing its excavation, failed to abide by UNESCO
resolutions and decisions.
In comparison to -the action taken by the General Conference of
UNESCO, the Executive Board's action was potentially more conciliato-
ry, consistent with article 23 of the convention. That article allows
signatories to call upon UNESCO for technical assistance either in
protecting their cultural property or "in connexion with any other
problem arising out of the application of the . . . Convention" and
allows UNESCO on its own initiative to make proposals on these
matters. 46  Broadly interpreted, technical assistance might encompass
not only purely scientific aid but also whatever additional aid might be
necessary for and helpful to resolving disputes concerning cultural prop-
erty.
45. Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of Resolutions 3.342
and 3.343, UNESCO Doc. 83 EX/12 (1969). See also 15 UNESCO Gen'l Conf.
Records, Resolutions, UNESCO Doc. 15 C/Res. 3.342 and 3.343 (1968).
46. See 1954 Convention, supra note 16, arts. 22-23, 249 U.N.T.S. 256, 258.
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In a move apparently implementing the broadest policy of article
23, the Executive Board invited the director-general:
(a) to assist the parties concerned, both public and private, by
technical advice relating either to questions of general import or
to particular, specific problems and to supplement such advice by
technical assistance designed to facilitate its application;
(b) to seek the means of ensuring the rigorous and effective ap-
plication of the said Convention, Recommendation, resolutions and
decision;
(c) to provide world public opinion with objective information on
these matters with a view to enlightening its judgement and also
to promote, in connexion with the preservation of Jerusalem, a vast
movement of understanding and mutual respect between the cul-
tures whose historical roots are there. .... 47
Unfortunately, the Executive Board's offer was interpreted by the parties
in its narrowest sense. Israel accepted the offer of technical assistance
in the form of an expert scientific mission,48 but neither Israel nor its
adversaries chose to view the Executive Board's offer broadly as includ-
ing the provision of services designed to facilitate a settlement of the
dispute. Furthermore, UNESCO itself did not exercise its authority to
initiate proposals, aimed at resolving the dispute, although such a pro-
posal could have concerned these services. Instead, the parties to the
dispute spurned the conciliatory approach offered by the Executive
Board's proposal, and UNESCO's involvement was limited to issuing
formal legal statements which had questionable binding force rather
than on fostering cooperative supervision of the excavations.
Appropriateness of the UNESCO Dispute-Settlement
Techniques and Sanctions
Notwithstanding the encouragement of both the 1954 convention
and its own Executive Board to offer technical assistance, UNESCO
continued over a span of some seven years to be primarily concerned
with the legalistic niceties of the dispute and to be intent on restraining
all excavation during the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem. This focus
was ill-advised.
The director-general of UNESCO did effectively solicit and receive
reports on the physical implications of the excavations. These reports
were submitted by experts, including the commissioners general for
47. Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of Resolutions 3.342
and 3.343, UNESCO Doc. 83 EX/12 (1969) (emphasis added).
48. See Report of the Director-General of UNESCO, UNESCO Doc. 18 C/VR3-1,
183; Report of the Director-General on the Implementation of 88 EX/Dec. 4.3.1.,
UNESCO Doc. 89/EX 19 Rev., at 4 (1972).
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cultural property in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egyp 9 and a
"special consultant to Jerusalem."5" The reports tended to support the
Israeli position that its excavations were being conducted in an un-
biased, scientific manner, although they also reveal occasional lapses of
creditable activity. 51 Unfortunately, the reports were either ignored or
discounted by the Executive Board, as it continued to treat the dispute
as a legalistic one. Thus, when the UNESCO decisions restraining all
excavation were communicated to the Israeli government, it was only
natural-and possibly, in view of the legal uncertainties, entirely accept-
able-that they were met with polite but firm dismissals.5 2 The Israeli
reponses, in turn, served to harden further the position of Israel's
adversaries within UNESCO and to intensify their insistence upon inef-
fective injunctions against the Israeli excavations.
The adversary process by which UNESCO attempted to resolve the
dispute led finally and perhaps inevitably to the adoption of the contro-
versial 1974 resolutions against Israel. On the merits, the resolution
which denied Israers application for inclusion within the European
regional grouping seems appropriate, in view of the criteria for classifi-
cation and selection;53 in view of previous rejections of applications by
other member states; 54 in view of the lack of confidence expressed in
Israel by the very members of the European group with which Israel, if
made a member, would have had to work closely;55 and incidentally, in
49. See Lang, supra note 17, at 677-78.
50. Information Note Presented by the Director-General, UNESCO Doc. 88 EX/
47, at 1 (1971).
51. See, e.g., id. at 5, f 11, 12; Report of the Government of Jordan on the
Violation of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, UNESCO Doc. 88 EX/46 (1971).
52. Letter from Abba Eban, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, to the
UNESCO Director-General, Jan. 6, 1972, in Report of the Director-General on the
Implementation of 88 EX/Dec. 4.3.1., UNESCO Doc. 89 EX/19 Rev., at 4 (1972).
53. The criteria for regional grouping are (a) the country's interest in and ability
to contribute to the activities of the region, thereby facilitating the tasks of the organiza-
tion; (b) its geographical location; and (c) its historical, or cultural, or social traditions.
Criteria for Invitations to Regional Meetings, UNESCO Doc. 92 EX/12 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Criteria for Invitations to Regional Meetings].
54. For example, the United States and Canada had been excluded from regional
groups prior to 1974. Each had requested unsuccessfully at the seventeenth session of
the General Conference in 1972 to participate in the Second Conference of Ministers
of Education of European Member States. See A Statement on Israel by Amadou Mah-
tar M'Bow, Director-General of UNESCO, 28 UNESCO COURiER 34 (Jan. 1975).
55. The Executive Board had emphasized "that the inclusion of a Member State
in a region for the purpose of such participation cannot be obtained without the broad
consent of the Member States in the region concerned." Criteria for Invitations to Re-
gional Meetings, supra note 53, 8. Not including new members of the group, four-
view of Israel's Asian location-notwithstanding her inclusion in the
Western European group for purposes of election to the Executive
Board of UNESCO.56
The legality of the second resolution, calling for the director-
general to withhold assistance from Israel for so long as the country
failed to adhere to the proscriptive measures adopted by UNESCO, is
questionable. The UNESCO constitution provides for (1) the suspen-
sion of a member's right to vote upon failure to meet financial obliga-
tions to the organization; 57 (2) the suspension of other rights and privi-
leges upon request of the United Nations when similar actions have been
taken by the United Nations;5" and (3) expulsion from the organization
when the member has been expelled from the United Nations.59 Israel
contended that since none of the conditions for sanctions were met,
UNESCO was without power, on its own and without a United Nations
mandate, to suspend a member from the exercise of rights and privi-
leges. Since Israel considered the receipt of assistance from UNESCO
as a right inhering in membership in the United Nations, it considered
suspension of that right to be ultra vires of the UNESCO constitution.6"
Proponents of the resolution, however, placed a different interpre-
teen European group members voted in favor of the inclusion of Israel (Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, West Germany); ten voted against (Albania,
Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Ukraine,
U.S.S.R.); four abstained (France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey); and one was absent (Ru-
mania). UNESCO Gen'l Conf., UNESCO Doc. 18 C/VR. 42, at 21-22 (prov. ed.
1974).
The importance of regional voting was underscored in October, 1975, when the Ex-
ecutive Board voted 23-3-3 to recommend to the General Conference that only the
members of a particular geographic group be allowed to recommend membership in it.
Had that rule been in effect in 1974, a recommendation of Israel's application for mem-
bership in the European group would have depended solely upon the voting of European
group members and the plurality or majority required to make an affirmative recommen-
dation. Clarity, UNESCO's Board Votes for Softer Stand on Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct.
9, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
56. A Statement on Israel by Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, Director-General of
UNESCO, 28 UNESCO CouiuER 34 (Jan. 1975). A sample of regional groupings in
other specialized agencies of the United Nations shows that Israel was a member of two
European groups (Food and Agriculture Organization; World Meteorological Organiza-
tion) and two Asian-Middle Eastern groups (World Health Organization; International
Labor Organization). Its Asian identification was reinforced by its participation in the
Fifth Regional Conference of Asian National Commissions. Criteria for Invitations to
Regional Meetings, supra note 53, at Annexes II, III.
57. UNESCO Constitution, supra note 9, art. IV(C) (8) (b).
58. Id., art. 11(3).
59. Id., art. 11(4).
60. Lang, supra note 17, at 679.
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tation on the UNESCO constitution. They read article II, paragraph 4,
which requires suspension of a member's rights and privileges whenever
the United Nations has so acted and so requests, as being merely a
mandate to UNESCO to honor such a request. Thus those supporting
the resolution did not find article II, paragraph 4 to be a limitation by
implication on the power to suspend a member's rights and privileges in
other situations.6' Finding no such limitation elsewhere in the constitu-
tion, those favoring the resolution asserted without further elaboration
that the house was "authorized" to suspend a member's rights and
privileges.
Aside from any question concerning the legality of the second
resolution restricting assistance, the wisdom of that resolution is ques-
tionable from a purely practical viewpoint. Israel's contribution to
UNESCO' far exceeded any assistance it received from the organiza-
tion.62 Furthermore, in response to the second resolution, some mem-
ber states reduced or terminated their contributions to UNESCO.6" Thus
passage of the second resolution not only failed to bring the parties any
closer to resolving their dispute, but also hurt UNESCO financially.
A Better Mode of Conflict Management
It is difficult to perceive how UNESCO's approach to dispute
settlement, seeking to prohibit excavation altogether, could have been
expected to achieve one of the basic purposes of the organization, "to
contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among
. . . nations. . in order to further universal respect for justice,
[and] for the rule of law . ... " Nor does UNESCO's approach
appear to conform to two of the stated functions of the organization, to
"give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture"
and to "maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge; by assuring the
conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of. .. works of
art and monuments of history and science, and. . . by encouraging
cooperation among the nations in all branches of intellectual activity
... ,65 By foregoing a cooperative, programmatic approach to the
dispute in favor of a formal process leading to proscriptive resolutions,
61. UNESCO Doe. 18 C/VR 39, f 79.3 (prov. ed. 1974).
62. In 1974 Israel contributed $195,000 and received $26,000. Clarity,
UNESCO's Board Votes for Softer Stand on Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1975, at 1, col.
1.
63. See Heindel, UNESCO in Politics, 103 INTELLECT 361 (1975).
64. UNESCO Constitution, supra note 9, art. I(1).
65. Id., art. 1(2).
UNESCO only hardened each party's position, rejected its own constitu-
tional obligations, failed to resolve a serious conflict, tarnished its repu-
tation as a nonpolitical body, and lost financial support, for its opera-
tions. By imposing self-defeating and legally questionable sanctions,
UNESCO missed an opportunity to control the archaeological excava-
tions in a manner more acceptable to all concerned.
Israeli activities in occupied territory remain controversial.6 6 Since
careful, scientifically acceptable archaeological excavation is of global
value, however, an indefinite moratorium of the sort insisted on by
UNESCO is not justified. Instead, UNESCO should attempt to depoli-
ticize the dispute and, as emphasized by the director-general, should
"always [seek] a consensus through patient and open dialogue."6 7 With
reference to the archaeological dispute, the director-general cautioned:
[I]n an organization devoted to education, science and culture, we
must avoid those conflicts which take on the character of systematic
confrontations. We should perhaps also avoid the adoption of
resolutions, even with large majorities, that could result in deep
bitterness in certain quarters.68
One method which UNESCO might have undertaken for avoiding sys-
tematic confrontations, and which it might still seek to implement, was
suggested in 1971 by the UNESCO commissioner-general for cultural
property to Israel. In the conclusion to his report, he called for the
appointment of a committee of advisers, selected by an international
body such as UNESCO, to supervise archaeological activity in the
area.
6 9
In addition to failing to heed the advice of the commissioner-
general in 1971, UNESCO missed an opportunity to resolve the dispute
when it failed to implement the decision of its own Executive Board to
facilitate dialogue among the parties to the dispute and to provide
technical assistance designed to promote international cooperation in the
excavations. Although politics might still have intruded, a cooperative
approach to the dispute, in the absence of clearly defined procedural
and substantive guidelines, seems preferable to the formal, injunctive
66. See, e.g., Adams, Israeli Settlements: Obstacles to Peace?, Washington Post,
July 28, 1975, § A at 22, col. 3. In regard to recent Jordanian charges of Israeli acts
of desecration of the Ibrahami Mosque in Hebron, see U.N. Releases WS/723, at 4
(Aug. 15, 1975 and WS/724, at 4 Aug. 22, 1975).
67. Statement on Israel by Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, Director-General of
UNESCO, 28 UNESCO COURIER 34 (Jan. 1975).
68. Id.
69. Communication from Professor H.J. Reinink, Commissioner-General for Cul-
tural Property to Israel, UNESCO Doc. 87 EX/35, at 3 (1971).
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approach taken by UNESCO. Given the fragility of its legal frame-
work, UNESCO should employ techniques of dispute settlement such as
conciliation and mediation rather than resorting to adversary proceed-
ings resulting in unenforceable injunctions. Achieving the goal of
dispute settlement is largely a matter of skillful conflict management.

